The Second Punic War

The Second Punic War (218-201 BC), was a conflict between Rome and its rival state Carthage. In a struggle for existence, the two major powers in the Mediterranean at the time, fought in several theatres with both sides inflicting major defeats on the other. Rome, after coming as close as it had to destruction since its sacking by the Gauls in 390 BC, fought of Carthage at in Italy and managed to drive Carthage out of Spain. After a series of battles in Africa, Rome eventually stood victorious. However, the war saw many changes in fortune and remains one of the hardest fought wars in the history of the Roman Republic.

The Causes of the Conflict

After Carthage’s defeat in the First Punic War in 241, it had lost two major possessions in the Mediterranean. First as part of the Roman peace terms, it surrenderd the possession of Sicily. And second, after just three years of peace, Rome took advantage of Carthagenian in-fighting and seized Sardinia. This latter action was largely seen as unjustified and caused major resentment in the Carthagenians. However, in addition to this many Carthagenians such as Hamilcar Barca, were not prepared to except the outcome of the First Punic War as final. Hamilcar laid the foundations for a new war started by the Carthegineans in re-establishing Carthagenian power in Spain. Before his death, Hamilcar passed this animosity on to his son, the famous Hannibal. 

Hamilcar died in 229 BC and after his son-in-law Hasdrubal succeeded him, a final treaty with Rome was made. It was about the river Ebro, and the treaty of 226 BC made it the northern limit of Carthaginian power in Spain, and as such the southern limit of Roman interest. This treaty contained the seeds which would blossom into the Second Punic War. Rome previously had conlcuded an alliance with Saguntum which laid south of the Ebro. And while Rome was to claim that this alliance overode the Ebro treaty, Carthage saw the Ebro treaty as a sign that they could do as they please, including waging war against Sagunutum.

Hannibal succeeds his brother-in-law in 221, and by 220 the Saguntines request help from Rome expecting an invasion to be imminent. The Senate thus sent out emissaries to both Carthage and Hannibal directly. However, Hannibal was eager for a conflict with Rome, and the Senate was confident it could limit the conflict with Carthage to Spain. After Hannibals sacking of Saguntum in 219, and a brief internal dispute in the Senate, Rome declared war of Carthage. Unbeknownst to the Senate, which never envisaged that the war may come to Italy, thought itself still having the initiative. However, The ensuing war would be fought in Spain and Italy. While both arenas of war were operating simultaneously, blending into the other, it's easiest to follow events when one divides the two into different narratives. 

The War in Italy

218 BC - Leaving Carthago Nova around May, Hannibal reaches Rhone in September. P. Cornelius Scipio, one of the consuls of Rome who is being sent to Spain, arrives at the mouth of the Rhone simultaneously. There is a small cavalry skirmish, which Rome wins however Hannibal succeeds in crossing the river and heads for the Alps. Scipio sent the majority of his forces towards Spain under the command of his brother Gnaeus, while he himself returned to Italy. 

Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps is one of the most famous gambles in world history. While there is controversy over his exact route, the hardships he encountered with warring local tribes and harsh winter conditions are well known. While exact troop numbers are unclear as Hannibal had incurred considerable losses on his journey from Spain, however estimates are that he started with an army of around 70,000 strong and landed in Italy with around 35,000 men. 

Landing in Italy, Hannibal finds the local Gallic tribes as largely benevolent to him, with some revolting immediately against the Romans upon his arrival. After the first skirmish with Roman forces near the Rive Ticinius, which saw Scipio injured, the Romans retreated to Placentia, where the two consuls joined forces. It was in Trebbia, a river west of Placentia, where the war's first major battle was fought (December 218 - January 217). This battle would be Rome’s first major defeat, leaving half the Roman army destroyed.

217 BC - After the election of the new consuls C. Flaminius and Cn. Servilius Geminus, the two consuls, took their armies to different positions in the country. Flaminius to up position in Arretium; however, Hannibal proceeded to march past him towards the heart of Etruria. Giving chase, Flaminius and his army are caught in an ambush by Hannibal, who had concealed his army in the hills at the north-east corner of Lake Trasimene. The resulting massacre left Flaminius and 15,000 of his men dead and Rome suffering yet another major defeat. It would be the last time until 207 that Roman and Carthaginian forces met in the northern part of Italy. 

Rome now faced a major crisis. One consul was dead and the other was cut-off from the capital. Thus began the Roman strategy, originated by Q. Fabius Maximus which dominated Roman military movements, particularly after the defeat at Cannae in 216 all the way until 210. It was a strategy of causing attrition in the enemy and avoiding full-scale battles. While there were still battles, the policy was that they should be avoided in circumstances chosen by Hannibal and favorable to him. Directly after the battle of Trasimene, Fabius is appointed dictator and proceeds to first implement this stratagem. As Hannibal traveled from Trasimene to the Adriatic coast, Fabius kept close to Hannibal while avoiding a pitched battle. As Hannibal raided the plain between the River Volturnus and Mount Massicus, Fabius remained in the mountains. However, when Hannibal had to leave the plain to find winter quarters, Fabius managed to block all his exits. Only by an extraordinary piece of stratagem, which saw Hannibal driving a head of oxen, with blazing torches tied to their horns, up a mountain and diverting the attention of the Romans, was he able to escape. 

Fabius was summoned then back to Rome, while officially on religious business many historians speculate it was due to the ever growing discontent with his war policy. He left the magister equitum M. Minucius Rufus in charge, who was eager to discard the Fabian policy proceeded to engage Hannibal and won a minor victory. Discontent grew over the Fabian policies but after splitting the army between the two, Minucius had to be rescued by Fabius after once again engaging Hannibal and nearly perishing.

216 BC - With the term of the dictator lapsing before the end of 217 BC, in the new year two new consuls were elected. The new consuls L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro were each given a force of eight legions of 5000 men each, with the same number of allied forces, leaving a total of 80,000. Hannibal at the time occupied Cannae, an important supply base for the Romans in Apulia. Drawing the romans into a flat terrain that favoured the superior Cartheginian cavalry, Hannibal gave the Romans one if not the worst defeat in their entire history. After failing to break through the center of the Cartheginian lines, the Roman army was surrounded leading to a slaughter of an estimated 50,ooo men, including Consul Paullus, in one day. No battle would cost that many lives in one day again until the first World War. Of the 80,000 Romans at Cannae, only 14,500 men escaped death or captivity. While sources such as Livy and Polybius lay blame for the defeat on Varro, it is likely that it was the Senate as a whole agreed to engage Hannibal in a pitched battle, witht the two consuls only differing tactically and not strategically. 

The defeat at Cannae led to the defection to Hannibal of a large part of southern Italy. While most peoples did not fight for Hannibal, their resources were no longer available to Rome. It was especially the defection of Capua, Italy’s second largest city, that caused the greatest anger in Rome. It was during this crisis, under the dictators M. Iunius Pera and praetor M. Claudius Marcellus in which the Fabian strategy was reinvigorated. Hannibal captured Ncueria, Acerrae, and Casilinium but was held of at Nola, and both attempts to seize Naples and Cumae by Cartheginian and Capuan forces were thwarted. Rome’s aim was now to concentrate winning back towns and areas that had defected. It did so by putting a vastly increased number of troops in the field, which forced Hannibal to split up his own forces or risk leaving his allies without support. Rome aimed to make Hannibal unable to replenish his forces, so as to gain a numerical advantage so great that he would not be able to win and then either defeat him or force him out of Italy. While largely successful, this caused a huge strain on Roman and Italian manpower, and finances and accepted the ravaging of large parts of the Italian country side by Hannibal.

It is here that the greatness of Roman resilience can be seen. Many other nations and empire would have sued for peace after the defeat at Cannae. Rome however met the cirsis with a firm response, refusing to surrender and finding a way to climb out of such an abyss.